From the time the Indo-US nuclear deal was mooted inJuly 2005, there was almost instant opposition to it in both ꦫcountries-with manyin India, in the context of 30 years of adversarial🐟 relations with the US,predicting, as it went forward, step by step, that goalposts would be shifted bythe US and that the deal would fail.
No one could have foreseen that India’s domestic compulsions would be agreater danger to the success of the deal than US positions and pressures.Indeed, the opponents of the deal in India appeared astonished at the success ofthe Indian negotiators in obtaini♛ng t🍸he concessions they did, when the so-called123 Agreement was reached by both countries in August this year.
The parameters of what would be acceptable were laid out before Parliament bythe Prime Minister before the start of the negotiations. Initialꦓly, it appe𝐆aredthat there was cautious approval of the work done by the negotiators. However,this did not last, and the deal was attacked from the Right and the Left.
The BJP led NDA, which had, in a sense, been the originator of the idea of a‘ deal’ with the US, seemed to feel that the 123 Agreement jeopardized India’snuclear weapons programme by placing a cap on the production of fissile materialfor weapons purposes, as 8 reactors additional to the ones already under IAEAsafeguards, would be designated specifically for civilia🅠n purposes, and India’sfreedom to conduct more tests would become constrained by the provisions of thisAgreement.
The position of the Le🎀ft was more ferocious and ideological: they clearlystated that this Agreement would draw India closer to the US which wasunacceptable to them and that India’s independence in foreign policy makingwould be affected. The position taken by the Left was linked directly to itssupport of the government in Parliament.
At one point, it appeared that the government would bowto electoral pres♏sures and put the deal into cold storage. Around the middle ofthis month, however, it appeared that the logjam might be shifted. Aconciliation group was set up to sort out the issues⛎ between the Left and theUPA, and Brajesh Mishra, the National Security Adviser to the NDA government, inan interview to a national newspaper, stated quite explicitly that he was infavour of the deal, and indeed was apprehensive that it might not go through,provided he could be assured of the integrity and effectiveness of India’snuclear weapons programme. The Prime Minister then personally called on bothVajpayee and Advani and presumably gave them the assurances needed.
In the meanwhile, the Left parties, for what appeared to be a ‘dea🌸l’ initself, between discussions on Nandigram in Parliament and progress on theIndo-US deal, agreed that the government could start negotiations with the IAEAon safeguards to be applied to the facilities identified as civilian by India,the next step. However, both the Left and Right have continued to maintain theiropposition to the deal.
The Indo-US nuclear Agreement, a technical agreement with major implicationsfor India’s technical development and an essential opportunity for India’se🉐nergy choices, was a political gesture of goodwill by the US in the hope thatit would lead to the normalization of relations between the two countries.Unfortunately, it is politics, of the domestic variety that appears to begoverning its progress.
The deal has already been discussed in more detail thanperhaps any othe🐠r similar agreement with another country, but a൲ brief recap ofits contours would not be out of place. Three important and difficult steps havealready been taken and three more remain before the Agreement can even besigned. India has proposed a plan that would separate its civilian facilitiesfrom non-civilian ones to be implemented in 2014, the US Congress has agreed tochange US law that restricted civil nuclear cooperation with India, and abilateral Agreement has been reached to promote such cooperation.
Now, the civilian facilities identified by India will be eligible forinternational cooperation, if India places them under IAEA safeguards, th🦋at is,accepts inspections by international inspectors who will ensure that nosafeguarded material is diverted to India’s military programme. Then the 45member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has to agree that, notwithstanding the factthat India has not signed the NPT, is not a recognized nuclear weapon State, itwill have access to international cooperation for civilian purposes.
Without the exemption, neither the Russians nor the French are willing toenter into any kind of nuclear cooperation with India.(It has incorrectly beenclaimed that the Prime Minister could have signed an Agreement with the Russiansduring his recent visit to Moscow which could have been implemented; theRussians have themselves clearly informed India that they would be unable tomove on such an agreement unless the NSG approval was ob𝓰tained. And it is onlythe US that can obtain that approval, with of ✅course, the support of otherfriendly countries.) Finally, the US Congress and the Indian Cabinet will haveto approve the entire process; only then can implementation begin.
The objections of the Left and Right in India need to be and, I believe, arebeing addressed. The issue of India’s strategic programme has specificallybeen dealt with in the 123 Agreement--there is a commitment that neither partywill hinder or interfe♊re with the military programmes of the other. If the USCongress adopts the 123 Agreement, this would become US law.
As regards the Left’s objections: it is inconceivable that India, whichresisted international pressures when she was a weak country, would succumb topressures when she is so much stronger.ꦕ There is a lack of confidence in thecountry that it would not be able to retain its independence, which is soclearly misplaced that not even the Chinese share it! As for getting closer tothe US, surely that is for the people🌌 to decide.
The issues, therefore are not substantive--they are political, as I suspectthey are in the US as well. The non-🏅proliferation 🍰lobby in the US with greatinfluence on the Democrats, still infuriated at India’s independent nuclearprogramme, feels that India should not be rewarded for such independence.
There is no doubt that if the deal goes through, India will benefit greatly,economically, technologically and politically. At the same time, there will beexpectations from India--expectations that could have implication♌s for ourforeign policy. The task 🐓ahead for any government will be to manage thosechallenges , and to calibrate our responses to serve our interests as we seethem.
Arundhati Ghose was India's permanent representative/ ambassador to the United Nations. In 1996, she dramatically vetoed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament, a step that some say would not have been taken without her. This piece was originally written for Outlook Saptahik
